Numerical approximation of Nash equilibria for a class of
  non-cooperative differential games by Cacace, Simone et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
35
69
v1
  [
ma
th.
NA
]  
16
 Se
p 2
01
1 Numerical Approximation of Nash Equilibria fora Class of Non-Cooperative Differential Games
Simone Cacace∗, Emiliano Cristiani†, Maurizio Falcone‡
December 23, 2010
Abstract. In this paper we propose a numerical method to obtain an ap-
proximation of Nash equilibria for multi-player non-cooperative games with a
special structure. We consider the infinite horizon problem in a case which leads
to a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. The numerical method is based on
the Dynamic Programming Principle for every equation and on a global fixed
point iteration. We present the numerical solutions of some two-player games
in one and two dimensions. The paper has an experimental nature, but some
features and properties of the approximation scheme are discussed.
Key Words: Nash equilibria, approximation schemes, dynamic programming,
Hamilton-Jacobi systems.
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1 Introduction
The notion of Nash equilibrium is considered one of the most important achieve-
ments in the last century for its impact on the analysis of economic and social
phenomena. It is worth to note that the formal definition of Nash equilibria
[14] has opened new research directions and has attracted the interest of several
mathematicians to new fields of application. After the pioneering work of Von
Neumann and Morgenstern [15], the use of mathematically-based analysis in the
study of economic sciences has received new impulse from the work of Nash.
There is extensive literature dealing with Nash equilibria for non-cooperative
games, however the analysis of Nash equilibria for nonzero-sum multi-player
differential games is more limited (see e.g. the monographs [3, 13] for an pre-
sentation of this theory). Moreover, only few papers give a characterization of
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the value functions for the players in terms of partial differential equations, as it
was the case for control problems and for zero-sum differential games described
for example in [2]. More precisely, we know that under suitable regularity as-
sumptions, if the value functions of a non-cooperative nonzero-sum multi-player
differential game exist, they satisfy a system of first-order Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions, see [1]. Typically theoretical results about these problems are valid only
in very special cases and they are essentially limited to games in one dimension
and with a simple dynamics, see e.g. [4, 5, 6, 7]. More important, it is well
known that the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations can be ill-posed. To our
knowledge, there are no theoretical results if the dimension of the problem is
greater than one.
From the numerical point of view the situation is even more deceiving since
few results are available for Nash equilibria in the framework of non-cooperative
games. In particular, we mention the recent paper [10] where an approximation
of (static) Nash equilibria based on Newton methods is presented, and the paper
[9] where the approximation is obtained via penalty methods.
Our goal is to construct an approximation scheme for Nash equilibria for non-
cooperative differential games starting from the characterization obtained via
Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Following [5], we deal with the system of stationary
Hamilton-Jacobi equations giving a characterization of the value functions for
a class of infinite-horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted
in time. To this end we will extend to the system the class of dynamic pro-
gramming approximation schemes studied for zero-sum differential games. The
interested reader can find in [11] a detailed analysis of the schemes correspond-
ing to pursuit-evasion games as well as some numerical tests (see also [12] for the
origin of these methods and some control applications). At our best knowledge,
the approximation scheme proposed in this paper is the first for Nash equilibria
in the framework of differential games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the problem,
introduce the notations and recall the main results giving the characterization
of the value functions. In Section 3 we introduce the semi-discrete and fully-
discrete approximation schemes, and we describe the fixed point iterative scheme
for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Some remarks about the fixed
point algorithm are also discussed. Finally, in Section 4 we present the numerical
results for some problems in dimension one and two.
2 Setting the problem
Let us consider a m-player non-cooperative differential game with controlled
dynamics {
y˙(t) = f
(
y(t), α1(t), ..., αm(t)
)
y(0) = x
(1)
where t > 0, x ∈ Rn, f : Rn × Rk1 × ... × Rkm → Rn and αi : [0,+∞)→ Ai is
the (open-loop) control associated to the i-th player (i = 1, ...,m) within a set
of admissible control values Ai ⊆ R
ki , ki ≥ 1. We set Ai =
{
αi : [0,+∞) →
2
Ai , αi measurable
}
for i = 1, ...,m. In order to simplify the notations, we
also set α(·) = (α1(·), . . . , αm(·)) and we denote by yx(t;α(·)) the corresponding
solution of the Cauchy problem (1), i.e. the trajectory starting at x which
evolves according to the strategies α(·) of the m players.
We consider the infinite horizon problem, where each player has a running cost
discounted exponentially in time. More precisely, for i = 1, ...,m, we take λi > 0,
ψi : R
n × Rki × ...× Rkm → R and we define the cost functionals
Ji(x, α(·)) =
∫ +∞
0
ψi
(
yx(t;α(·)), α(·)
)
e−λit dt , i = 1, . . . ,m. (2)
We say that a m-tuple of feedback controls a∗(y) = (a∗1(y), ..., a
∗
m(y)) (i.e. func-
tions a∗i : R
n → Ai, i = 1, ...,m, depending on the state variable) is a Nash
non-cooperative equilibrium solution for the game (1) if
Ji(x, a
∗) = min
αi(·)∈Ai
Ji(x, a
∗
1, ...a
∗
i−1, αi(·), a
∗
i+1, ..., a
∗
m) , i = 1, ...,m . (3)
Note that for every given feedback control ai : R
n → Ai, i = 1, ...,m, and every
path y(t), t > 0, we can always define the corresponding open loop control
as ai(y(t)) ∈ Ai, so that, in the above definition, Ji(x, a
∗) is the i-th cost
associated to the trajectory yx(t; a
∗) in which all the optimal Nash strategies
a∗ are implemented, namely the solution of{
y˙(t) = f
(
y(t), a∗(y(t))
)
y(0) = x .
(4)
On the other hand the term Ji(x, a
∗
1, ...a
∗
i−1, αi(·), a
∗
i+1, ..., a
∗
m) in (3) is the i-th
cost associated to the trajectory yx(t; a
∗
1, ..., a
∗
i−1, αi(·), a
∗
i+1, ..., a
∗
m) correspond-
ing to the solution of{
y˙(t) = f
(
y(t), a∗1(y(t)), ..., a
∗
i−1, αi(·), a
∗
i+1, ..., am(y(t))
)
y(0) = x
(5)
where only the strategy αi(·) is chosen in Ai.
The definition of Nash equilibrium means that if the ith player replaces his
optimal control a∗i with any other strategy αi(·) ∈ Ai, then his running cost Ji
increases, assuming that the remaining players keep their own controls frozen.
The m-tuple a∗ is then optimal in the sense that no player can do better for
himself, since he can not cooperate with any other player.
Let us assume that such a Nash equilibrium a∗ exists for our game problem.
For i = 1, ...,m we define the value function ui : R
n → R as the minimal cost
Ji associated to a
∗. More precisely, for every x ∈ Rn and i = 1, ...,m, we set
ui(x) = Ji(x, a
∗) . (6)
Then, it can be proved that all the ui satisfy a Dynamic Programming Principle
and by standard arguments we can derive a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations
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for u1, ..., um, in which the feedback control a
∗(x) = (a∗1(x), ..., a
∗
m(x)) depends
on the state variable x also through the gradients ∇u1(x), ...,∇um(x). We get
λiui(x) = Hi
(
x,∇u1(x), ...,∇um(x)
)
x ∈ Rn , i = 1, ...,m , (7)
where, for every i = 1, ...,m and for every x, p1, ..., pm ∈ R
n, the Hamiltonians
Hi : R
n+nm → R are given by
Hi(x, p1, ..., pm) = pi · f
(
x, a∗1(x, p1, ..., pm), ..., a
∗
m(x, p1, ..., pm)
)
+ (8)
+ψi
(
x, a∗1(x, p1, ..., pm), ..., a
∗
m(x, p1, ..., pm)
)
.
Moreover, for every x ∈ Rn and i = 1, ...,m, the following property holds:
Hi
(
x,∇u1(x), ...,∇um(x)
)
=
= min
ai∈Ai
{
∇ui(x) · f
(
x, a∗1(x), ..., a
∗
i−1(x), ai, a
∗
i+1(x), ..., a
∗
m(x)
)
+ (9)
+ψi
(
x, a∗1(x), ..., a
∗
i−1(x), ai, a
∗
i+1(x), ..., a
∗
m(x)
)}
.
We remark that in (9) the minimum is performed among all the control values
ai ∈ Ai and not among all the strategies αi(·) ∈ Ai.
3 Numerical approximation
This section is devoted to the introduction of the semi-discrete and the fully-
discrete scheme for the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations (7), the fixed-point
algorithm, and to a brief discussion about the algorithm.
3.1 Semi-discrete and fully-discrete scheme
Here we propose a numerical scheme to compute the value functions ui, i =
1, . . . ,m defined in (6). To simplify the presentation and for computational
purposes, we deal with a two-player game (m = 2), with scalar controls (i.e.
k1 = k2 = 1) and a dynamics in one or two dimensions (n = 1, 2). Moreover,
we assume the discount rates λ1 = λ2 = 1.
In order to discretize the Hamiltonians Hi we use a semi-Lagrangian scheme,
which usually gives more accurate results than finite difference schemes or oth-
ers schemes. The reader can find in [12] a comprehensive introduction to this
subject. As usual we first obtain a semi-discrete scheme, introducing a fictitious
time step h > 0, which reads as

u1(x) = min
a1∈A1
{
1
1 + h
u1(x+ h f(x, a1, a
∗
2)) +
h
1 + h
ψ1(x, a1, a
∗
2)
}
u2(x) = min
a2∈A2
{
1
1 + h
u2(x+ h f(x, a
∗
1, a2)) +
h
1 + h
ψ2(x, a
∗
1, a2)
} (10)
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where we remind that the control a∗ = (a∗1, a
∗
2) depends on x and ∇u1(x),
∇u2(x). Note that the time step h can be interpreted as the discrete time cor-
responding to the approximation of the trajectories starting from x and moving
according to the dynamics f .
Now let us consider a subdomain Ω ⊂ Rn in which we look for the approx-
imate solutions of the system described above. We discretize Ω by means of a
uniform grid of size ∆x denoted by G = {x1, . . . , xN}, where N is total number
of nodes. For i = 1, 2 we denote by Ui ∈ R
N the vector containing the values of
ui at the grid nodes, i.e. (Ui)j = ui(xj), j = 1, . . . , N . Moreover, for i = 1, 2,
let A#i be a finite discretization of the set of admissible controls Ai.
Note that even for x = xj the point z(xj , a
∗) = xj + h f(xj , a
∗)) appearing
in (10) will not coincide with a node of the grid G. Then, an interpolation is
needed to compute the value of ui at z (this is the main difference with respect
to a standard finite difference approximation). First of all, denoting by ‖f‖∞
the infinity norm of f with respect to all its variables and choosing
h =
∆x
‖f‖∞
(11)
we guarantee that the point z lies in one of the first neighbouring cells around
xj , denoted by I(z). Then, the value ui(z) is reconstructed by a linear inter-
polation of the values of ui at the vertices of the cell I(z) (see [12] for more
details and [8] for an efficient algorithm in high dimension). Let Λ(a) denote
the N×N matrix which defines the interpolation: for j = 1, . . . , N , the jth row
contains the weights to be given to the values (Ui)1, . . . , (Ui)N in order to com-
pute ui(z(xj , a)). The fully-discrete version of the system (10) can be written
in compact form as

(U1)j = min
a1∈A
#
1
{
1
1 + h
(Λ(a1, a
∗
2) U1)j +
h
1 + h
ψ1(xj , a1, a
∗
2)
}
(U2)j = min
a2∈A
#
2
{
1
1 + h
(Λ(a∗1, a2) U2)j +
h
1 + h
ψ2(xj , a
∗
1, a2)
}
.
(12)
where the index j varies from 1 to N .
We remark that for an actual implementation, the values of U at the boundary
nodes of the grid must be managed apart, in order to impose boundary condi-
tions on ∂Ω. In Section 4 dedicated to numerical tests, we will use Dirichlet
boundary conditions, taking notice of the influence they could have on the nu-
merical solution inside Ω.
We are ready to describe the algorithm we actually implemented.
Fixed point algorithm
1. Choose two tolerances ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0.
Set k = 0. Choose an initial guess for the values of Ui, i = 1, 2 and denote
them by U
(0)
i .
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2. For j = 1, . . . , N
(a) Find a∗ ∈ A#1 ×A
#
2 such that

a∗1 = argmin
a1∈A
#
1
{
1
1 + h
(
Λ(a1, a
∗
2) U
(k)
1
)
j
+
h
1 + h
ψ1(xj , a1, a
∗
2)
}
a∗2 = argmin
a2∈A
#
2
{
1
1 + h
(
Λ(a∗1, a2) U
(k)
2
)
j
+
h
1 + h
ψ2(xj , a
∗
1, a2)
}
.
Note that the search for a∗ can be done in an exhaustive way, due to
the fact that the set A#1 ×A
#
2 is finite.
(b) If a∗ is found, go to Step (c), otherwise stop (if more than one Nash
optimal control is available, we select the first one we find).
(c) Solve, for i = 1, 2,
(U
(k+1)
i )j =
1
1 + h
(
Λ(a∗) U
(k)
i
)
j
+
h
1 + h
ψi(xj , a
∗) (13)
3. If ‖U
(k+1)
i − U
(k)
i ‖RN < εi, i = 1, 2, then stop, else go to step 2 with
k ← k + 1.
3.2 Some remarks about the fixed point algorithm
We introduce a vector U containing the two value functions,
U = ((U1)1, . . . , (U1)N , (U2)1, . . . , (U2)N ) ∈ R
2N
and a vector Ψ containing the two cost functions,
Ψ(a) = (ψ1(x1, a), . . . , ψ1(xN , a), ψ2(x1, a), . . . , ψ2(xN , a)) ∈ R
2N .
We also define a fixed point operator F = (F1, . . . , F2N ) : R
2N → R2N , given
component-wise by
Fj(U) =
1
1 + h
(Λ(a∗) U)j +
h
1 + h
(Ψ(a∗))j , j = 1, . . . , 2N , (14)
where, with an abuse of notation, we denoted again by Λ(a) the block matrix(
Λ(a) 0
0 Λ(a)
)
.
In this way the scheme (13) can be written as U = F (U).
In the case of a one-player game or two-player zero-sum games with minmax
equilibrium, it can be easily proven that the corresponding fixed point operator
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(defined similarly as before) is a contraction map, see for example [11]. More
precisely, denoted by G the operator, it can be proved that, for some norm ‖ · ‖,
‖G(U)−G(V )‖ ≤
1
1 + h
‖U − V ‖ , ∀ U, V. (15)
In the case of Nash equilibria, the arguments leading to the proof of (15) are not
valid. Nevertheless, we could in principle compute the Jacobian matrix JF (U)
of F (U), i.e.,
JF (U) =
(
∂Fq(U)
∂Ur
)
q,r=1,...,2N
(16)
and then study the behaviour of its norm. In this respect, it is important
to note that the optimal control a∗ which appears in (14) actually depends
on U , and then Λ(a∗) depends on U . This makes the analytical computation
of JF (U) extremely difficult, since we should know the derivative of a
∗ with
respect to U . Nevertheless, in some particular cases the computation can be
easy. Indeed, since we assume that A#1 ×A
#
2 is finite, it is reasonable to expect
that small variation of U do not produce a change of a∗, i.e. the function a∗(U)
is ”piecewise constant”. It is worth to note that in the zones of R2N where
a∗(U) is constant, ‖JF (U)‖∞ is easy computed and we have
‖JF (U)‖∞ =
1
1 + h
< 1 (17)
as in the one-player case or the two-player zero-sum minmax case [11] (the result
easily follows from the fact that the sum of the elements of each row of Λ is 1,
by definition of linear interpolation). Summarizing, it results that F (U) can be
piecewise contractive in the ∞-norm, according to the following
Definition 1 A function F : R2N → R2N is piecewise contractive in the norm
‖ · ‖ if and only if :
a) F is differentiable a.e. in R2N ;
b) ‖JF (x)‖ < 1 for all the points x ∈ R
2N where F is differentiable.
From the numerical point of view, we can compute the Jacobian matrix JF (U)
of F (U) and check if ‖JF (U)‖∞ < 1 for some U . Such a computation can give
some information about the behaviour of F near a tentative solution. Moreover,
we can plot the graph of some component Fq of F as a function of one of its
variables Ur, again in order to understand the regularity of F .
4 Numerical tests
The aim of this section is to provide some numerical simulations in dimensions
n = 1, 2 in order to give some insights about the well-posedness of system (7).
We believe that such results can be useful to lead future theoretical investiga-
tions.
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Let us start by the one dimensional examples analyzed in [5]. The game takes
place in R with scalar controls a1, a2 ∈ R and it is driven by the dynamics
f(x, a1, a2) = a1 + a2 . (18)
The cost functions are
ψi(x, a1, a2) = hi(x) +
a2i
2
, i = 1, 2 , (19)
where the hi’s are smooth functions satisfying |h
′
i(x)| ≤ C for some constant C.
For reader’s convenience, we recall here a notion of admissible solution for
the system (7) introduced in [5], for which an existence and uniqueness result
is available (see [5], Theorem 4).
Definition 2 A function u = (u1, u2) : R→ R
2 is called an admissible solution
to the system (7) if the following holds:
(A1) u is absolutely continuous and satisfies system (7) at a.e. point x ∈ R .
(A2) u has sublinear growth at infinity, i.e., there exists a positive constant C
such that, for all x ∈ R,
|u(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|) .
(A3) At every point x ∈ R, the derivative u′ admits left and right limits u′(x−),
u′(x+). At points where u′ is discontinuous, these limits satisfy at least
one of the conditions
u′1(x−) + u
′
2(x−) ≥ 0 or u
′
1(x+) + u
′
2(x+) ≤ 0 .
Test 1
We choose the dynamics (18) and cost functions (19) with hi(x) ≡ 0, i = 1, 2.
The corresponding system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations is

u1 = −
(
u′1
2
+ u′2
)
u′1 ,
u2 = −
(
u′2
2
+ u′1
)
u′2
(20)
and admits at least the following three formal solutions:
u1(x) ≡ u2(x) ≡ 0 ,
u1(x) =
{
0 if |x| ≥ 1
− 12 (1− |x|)
2 otherwise ,
u2(x) = 0 ,
and
û1(x) = −
1
2
x2 , û2(x) = 0 ,
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with optimal controls a∗ = (−u′1,−u
′
2), a
∗ = (−u′1,−u
′
2) and â
∗ = (−û′1,−û
′
2)
respectively.
It is easy to check that u = (u1, u2) is the only admissible solution among the
three above. Indeed, the solution u does not satisfy condition (A3) in Definition
2, whereas the solution û does not satisfy condition (A2) in Definition 2.
We solve system (20) by means of the semi-Lagrangian scheme presented in
Section 3.1. Let the numerical domain Ω = [−50, 50] be discretized in 51 nodes.
Moreover we approximate the sets of admissible controls A1 = A2 = R with 101
values uniformly distributed in [−10, 10]. For i = 1, 2 we set the initial guess
U
(0)
i equal to a large constant. In this case a Nash equilibrium is always found
and the scheme converges to the admissible solution u ≡ 0. We observe that
the scheme converges to this solution also starting from the solution u itself or
from small perturbations of it. Conversely, the two other solutions seem to be
unstable: even if we choose them as initial guess, the scheme still converges to
u. We only remark that the case of û requires a larger set of controls, due to
the large values attained in Ω by the optimal control â∗ = (−û′1,−û
′
2) = (x, 0).
Concerning the Dirichlet boundary condition, we have noted that a large con-
stant does not affect the solution inside the numerical domain and the scheme
converges quite fast, whereas a negative value leads to the formation of bound-
ary layers that dramatically slow down (and sometimes hinder) the convergence.
For example, if we choose the value−10 as Dirichlet boundary condition for both
U1 and U2, we obtain, after 200 iterations, the results shown in Fig. 1.
−50 0 50
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
U1
−50 0 50
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
U2
Figure 1: Test 1. A boundary layer effect for the value functions U1 (left) and
U2 (right).
Test 2
Here we consider again the two-player game described by the dynamics (18)
and cost functions (19), where now we choose hi(x) = kix for i = 1, 2, with
constants k1, k2 satisfying k1 < 0 < k2 and k1 + k2 6= 0. In this special case the
solution is explicit, given by
u(x) =
(
u1(x), u2(x)
)
=
(
k1x− k1k2 − k
2
1/2 , k2x− k1k2 − k
2
2/2
)
.
Moreover it is the unique admissible solution of system (7), by virtue of The-
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orem 4 proved in [5]. We choose the same parameters of Test 1 and k1 = −1,
k2 = 2. Starting with the projection of u on the grid, the algorithm reaches
convergence immediately. Moreover, we observe convergence also starting from
small perturbations of u and from a constant initial guess U (0) ≡ C with
C ≥ max
x∈[−50,50]
max{u1(x), u2(x)} .
However convergence is not guaranteed for any initial guess.
Fig. 2 shows the approximate value functions compared with the exact solution
corresponding to the choice U (0) ≡ C = 150. Following [5], the existence and
−50 0 50
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
U1
−50 0 50
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
U2
Figure 2: Test 2. Comparison between exact solution (solid line) and approxi-
mate solution (circles). u1 and U1 are plotted on the left, u2 and U2 are plotted
on the right.
uniqueness result for admissible solutions holds in the more general case in which
hi(x) is a sufficiently small perturbation of kix, for i = 1, 2. More precisely, for
k1, k2 such that k1 < 0 < k2 and k1 + k2 6= 0, it is assumed that
|h′1(x) − k1| ≤ δ , |h
′
2(x)− k2| ≤ δ ,
for all x ∈ R and a sufficiently small δ > 0.
We apply our algorithm also in this case, by choosing δ = 2 and
h1(x) = k1x− δ cos(x) , h2(x) = k2x− δ cos(x) .
We choose a constant initial guess equal to 100 and the set of admissible controls
is [−300, 300]. The algorithm converges to a reasonable solution shown in Fig.
3.
Test 3
Here we present a two-dimensional test with an easy coupled dynamics. We
choose
f(x, y, a1, a2) = (a2, a1) , (21)
10
−50 0 50
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
U1
−50 0 50
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
U2
Figure 3: Test 2. Comparison between exact solution obtained with δ = 0 (solid
line) and approximate solution with δ = 2 (dots and line). u1 and U1 are plotted
on the left, u2 and U2 are plotted on the right.
with cost functions
ψi(x, y, a1, a2) =
{ √
x2 + y2 if
√
x2 + y2 > 1
0 otherwise
, i = 1, 2. (22)
In this game the two players have the same cost function and want to steer the
dynamics in the unit ball centred in (0, 0) where the cost is 0. Considering the
symmetry of the data, we expect u1 = u2. The numerical domain is Ω = [−2, 2]
2
and it is discretized by 51 × 51 nodes. The sets of admissible controls are
A1 = A2 = [−1, 1], and they are discretized choosing A
#
1 = A
#
2 = {−1, 0, 1}.
For i = 1, 2 we set the initial guess U
(0)
i equal to a large constant. Convergence
is reached in a few hundreds of iterations, the results are shown in Fig. 4.
The value functions show the expected behaviour, being equal to 0 in the
−2
−1
0
1
2
−2
−1
0
1
2
0
0.5
1
1.5
U1
−2
−1
0
1
2
−2
−1
0
1
2
0
0.5
1
1.5
U2
Figure 4: Test 3. Approximate solutions U1 (left) and U2 (right).
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unit ball centred in (0, 0) and growing uniformly in every directions. We also
computed numerically the infinity norm of the Jacobian matrix of F , finding
‖JF (U)‖∞ =
1
1 + h
(see (17)) in three cases for U : the final solution, the initial guess and an
intermediate value of the fixed point algorithm.
Test 4
The last test is devoted to the investigation of a case where the algorithm does
not converge. Indeed, choosing
f(x, y, a1, a2) = (a1 + a2, a1 − a2) , (23)
ψi(x, y, a1, a2) = x
2 + y2, i = 1, 2 (24)
and the other parameters as in Test 3, only some values stabilize, whereas oth-
ers oscillate. In Fig. 5 we show the surfaces of U1, U2 obtained after 1000
iterations. Let us focus our attention on two nodes with different features.
−2
−1
0
1
2
−2
−1
0
1
2
0
1
2
3
4
U1
−2
−1
0
1
2
−2
−1
0
1
2
0
1
2
3
4
U2
Figure 5: Test 4. Approximate solutions U1 (left) and U2 (right) after 1000
iterations.
In the first node we observe convergence whereas in the second we observe
an oscillating behavior of the approximating sequence. Let j0 ∈ {1, ..., 2N}
be the node corresponding to the central point (0, 0) for U1. We freeze all
the values of U = (U1, U2) except (U)j0 , which is replaced by a real vari-
able s. In Fig. 6 we plot the component Fj0 (U) of F (U) as a function of s,
i.e. Fj0(s) = Fj0 ((U)1, ..., (U)j0−1, s, (U)j0+1, ..., (U)2N ). Compared with the
identity function, it is immediately clear that it is discontinuous and piecewise
contractive with two fixed points (see Definition 1), labelled P and Q (see Fig.
6). We observe that by our algorithm the value of the node j0 converges to the
fixed point Q.
Conversely, the value of the node corresponding to the point (0, 0 + ∆x)
does not reach convergence. Similarly as before, we plot the component of the
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Figure 6: Test 4. First line: the identity function (solid line) and one of the
component of F as a function of one of its argument (dots and line). The
function turns to be piecewise contractive with two fixed points P andQ. Second
line: zoom around P (left) and Q (right).
function F corresponding to that point, obtaining the result shown in Fig. 7. In
this case the function is piecewise contractive with no fixed points. The value
of the node oscillates between two values around the discontinuity, as expected.
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